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Abstract The recent financial turmoil has stimulated a rich debate in the banking and financial 
literature on the identification of systemic risk determinants, as well as of devices to forecast and 
prevent crises. This paper explores the contribution of corporate variables on systemic risk with a 
CoVaR approach (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2016). Using a balanced panel database covering 
141 European banks belonging to 24 European countries, listed from 2006Q1 to 2012Q4, we 
investigate the impact of corporate variables over several regimes that characterised the 
European context in recent years, namely the subprime crisis (2007Q3-2008Q3), the European 
Great Financial Depression (2008Q4-2010Q2) and the sovereign debt crisis (2010Q3-2012Q4). 
Our empirical evidence shows that size did not play a significant role in spreading systemic risk, 
while maturity mismatch did. However, the nature and the intensity of these two determinants 
vary across the three crises. 
 
Keywords: Systemic Risk, Banking System, Global Financial Crises, Value at Risk, CoVaR, 
Panel data. 
 




Over the period 2006-2012, the European banking system was affected by 
three different regimes of financial turmoil: the Subprime Crisis, running from the 
start of the real estate subprime loans crisis in 2007Q3 to 2008Q3 (also identified as 
“early crisis”, see e.g. Kashyap and Zingales, 2010; Kuppuswamy and Villalonga, 
2010); the Great Financial Depression, running from 2008Q4 (the bankruptcy of 
Lehman Brothers) to 2010Q2 (also identified as “late crisis”, see e.g. Kashyap and 
Zingales, 2010; Kuppuswamy and Villalonga, 2010); and the Sovereign Debt 
Crisis, running from 2010Q3 (in correspondence of emerging news about Greece’s 
default) to 2012Q4 (see e.g. Giordano et al., 2013; Beirne and Fratzscher, 2013). 
Following these financial crises, national and international monetary 
authorities have devoted an increasing attention to the efficacy and stability of the 
banking system (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). This has led to a substantial 
reconsideration of the role of the supervision system for the banking and financial 
industries. In Europe, banking supervision authorities focused their attention on 
measures of micro-prudential regulation, like the different capital requirements of 
the Basel I, Basel II and then Basel III Agreements2. More recently, this approach 
was extended to a macro-prudential perspective (Borio, 2003).  
                                                 
2 Basel I Agreement, signed in 1988, obliges banks to keep as reserve the 8% of their loans, 
without considering the level of risk of loans. To this purpose, Basel II Agreement, published in 
2004, has a more complex system of evaluation of credit riskiness, known as the three Basel’s 
pillars based on several banks’ features. The break-up of the recent financial crises forced the 
European monetary authorities (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision) to agree in 2010-2011 
the Basel III to improve the quantity and quality of the banking capital and the introduction of two 
innovative indicators such as the liquidity coverage and the net stable funding ratios. 
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The challenges of the recent financial crises have pushed financial 
literature to devote much effort in understanding and describing the different 
features of systemic risk (Hansen, 2014, Paltalidis et al., 2015) and  systemic risk 
leading factors (Weiss et al., 2014a; Allen et al., 2010), as well as in implementing 
reliable interventions to overcome this  phenomenon (Rodriguez-Moreno and Pena, 
2013). Several authors investigate this issue from different perspectives, either 
related to the connection between bank size and systemic risk (Pais and Stork, 
2013) in a cross-country perspective (Slijkerman et al., 2013; Weiss et al., 2014b) 
or in its connection with financial contagion and financial fragility (Betz et al., 
2016; Martinez-Jaramillo et al., 2010). Indeed, a crucial point is the measurement of 
risk. In addition to the traditional measures, often criticised because mainly limited 
to balance sheet information (Huang et al., 2009), more recent studies (Acharya et 
al., 2012; Black et al., 2016) focus on corporate variables related to the maturity 
mismatch between assets and liabilities. 
In this paper, we make use of the CoVaR measure of systemic risk 
proposed by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016), that consider the role of both market 
and corporate variables, i.e. size, maturity mismatch and leverage, on systemic risk 
during the recent crises. Along the line of Black et al. (2016) and Lopez-Espinosa et 
al. (2012), our analysis covers the European Banking system, as we analyse a 
sample of 141 European banks continuously listed in the stock markets of 24 
European countries, belonging both to the Euro and non-Euro area, from the first 
quarter of 2006 (2006Q1) to the last quarter of 2012 (2012Q4). As a contribution to 
former literature, our analysis explores the different phases of the recent financial 
crises that affected European markets up to 2012, namely the Subprime Crisis, the 
Great Financial Depression, and the Sovereign Debt Crisis.  
 Our results challenge a traditional assumption in the analysis of the 
European system, linking the “too big to fail” issue to a higher contribution of large 
banks to systemic risk factors. In particular, we find  that, if we consider the whole 
sample period, size is likely to act as a shield against systemic risk, rather than 
boosting the phenomenon. By contrast, other corporate variables and financial 
ratios (i.e. maturity mismatch, beta, market to book value and market volatility) are 
more likely to affect systemic risk. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes our 




2. METHODOLOGY, DATA AND VARIABLES 
 
Our analysis is performed on the 141 continuously listed banks belonging 
to 24 different countries over the period from 2006Q1 to 2012Q4, as reported in 
Table 1, representing roughly 70% of the market capitalization of the European 
banking system3. 
                                                 
3 Given the balanced nature of our sample (i.e. banks non continuously listed have been dropped), 
the coverage of banking systems is not homogeneous among countries. For example, only one 
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[INSERT SOMEWHERE HERE TABLE 1] 
 
Our measure of systemic risk is based on the CoVaR introduced by Adrian 
and Brunnermeier (2016). While the Value-at-Risk (VaR) of an institution focuses 
on the risk of an individual entity in isolation, the CoVaR , is an indicator of 
systemic risk, defined as the VaR of the financial system as a whole, conditional on 
some event C(Xi) related to the institution i. Therefore, the 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑞𝑞
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝐶𝐶(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) is 
defined by the q-th quantile of the conditional probability distribution: 
 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝐶𝐶(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) ≤ (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝐶𝐶(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖)) = 𝑞𝑞%                  (1) 
                              
 where 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 is the market-valued asset return of institution i, and 𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 is 
the return of the portfolio, computed as the average of the 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖’s weighted by the 
lagged market value assets of the institutions in the portfolio. Adrian and 
Brunnermeier (2016) measure the contribution of each single institution to systemic 
risk by the ΔCoVaR, namely the difference between CoVaR conditional on the 
institution being in distress and CoVaR in the median state of the institution. 
Formally, the Δ𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 , i.e. the contribution to systemic risk of institution i during 
the q quartile, is defined as follows: 
 
Δ𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑞𝑞
𝑖𝑖 = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶50𝑖𝑖 = ?̂?𝛽𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶50𝑖𝑖 )                (2) 
 
 where  q is always set to be 5%, so that CoVaRi  identifies the system losses 
predicted on the 5% loss of institution i, while ΔCoVaRi identifies the deterioration 
in the system losses, when the institution i moves from its median state to its 5% 
worst scenario. As far as the estimation method is concerned, quantile regressions 
(q) are employed to estimate the VaRs and CoVaRs (see appendix). Table 2 provides 
summary statistics for the market-valued asset return (Xi), for the market portfolio 
𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠, for the CoVaR and ΔCoVaR of the 141 banks, estimated weekly over the 
period from 2006Q1-2012Q3. 
 
[INSERT SOMEWHERE HERE TABLE 2] 
  
 The main goal of our analysis is to evaluate the correlation between 
corporate variables and the measure of systemic risk, in order to forecast what are 
the bank features more likely to increase the contribution to the overall risk. 
Following Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) and Lopez Espinosa et al. (2012), we 
                                                                                                                       
bank is included for the following countries: Luxembourg and The Netherlands  in the Euro area; 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic and Hungary in the non-Euro area. Given the choice to study a 
balanced panel, we decide to not apply any filters to the sample. We check data for robustness and 
no bias have been revealed. As it is, the sample represents the most part of market capitalization, 
therefore a very significant sample from a statistical point of view. 
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make use of the following corporate variables, collected from the quarterly balance 
sheets of all the European banks included in the sample: 
 
1) 1, −tiLeverage  is calculated as the total assets (book value) to equity ratio 
of bank i at quarter (t-1); 
2)  1, −tiMM  is the maturity mismatch, namely the relative level of short term 
funding, calculated as the ratio between total short term debt minus cash and 
total liabilities, for bank i at quarter (t-1). This ratio is a proxy of the 
interconnectedness between financial institutions (see also Allen et al., 2010; 
Acharya and Merrouche, 2012; Lopez-Espinosa et al., 2012); 
3) 1, −tiSize  , as the market value of total assets of bank i at quarter (t-1;)  
4) 1, −tiMBV  is the market to book ratio, namely the ration between market 
value of equity and book value of equity, for bank i at quarter (t-1); 
5) tERV  is the equity return volatility for bank i at quarter (t-1), computed 
from daily equity returns data within each quarter; 
6) tBeta  is the equity market beta for bank i at quarter (t-1), computed from 
daily equity returns data within each quarter. 
 
 Table 3 reports the summary statistics for these corporate variables. The 
average leverage of the European banks in the sample suggests that only roughly 
6% of banks’ assets are financed by equity. This measure represents, in broad terms, 
a proxy of the Core Tier 1 index4. The average size of the bank’s total assets is 
roughly 54 billion of Euro5. Market-to-book values exceed 16. We observe a low 
level of the beta coefficient during the crisis and a limited percentage of a maturity 
mismatch measure on the total liabilities of the banks. 
                                                 
4 The European Banking Authority set in February 2014 the value exceeds the minimum 
threshold of 5.5% Core Tier 1 as benchmark for times of crisis. 
 
5 Summary statistics of bank size (market value of total assets) show that average size is larger for 
Euro countries than for non-Euro countries. Change in size over time show that there was a 
substantial drop between 2008 and 2009. No relevant decline, by contrast, is evident before 2010. 
6 Descriptive statistics show that the average ratio of market to book value, in several countries, is 
less than one. This is the case in France (0.47), Italy (0.89) and Ireland (0.93), while the average 
value is positive for the remaining countries. A general decline in the ratio is observed between 
2007-2008 and 2009, i.e. during the period of Great Financial Depression. For instance, the 
market to book value of Irish banks changed dramatically, dropping from 1.85 in 2007 to 0.62 in 
2008 and then to 0.12 in 2009. Both German and Italian banks show similar pattern, with lower 
intensity. Finally, in Southern Europe, i.e in Greece, Spain and Portugal, there was a relevant 
decrease in the market to book value since 2010, i.e. in the period of the Sovereign Debt Crisis. 
We observed a few negative values in the value. We checked for robustness of our results when 
dropping these cases, and we did not identify any significant impact. 
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[INSERT SOMEWHERE HERE TABLE 3] 
 
 
3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
 
We estimated panel regression models with fixed effects: the inclusion of fixed 
effect is based on Hausman tests with statistical significance at less than 1% in all 
cases. The dependent variable is the itCoVaR∆ , and a full specification can be 
described as follows: 
  
∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 = 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖0 + 𝛽𝛽1∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠−1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠−1 + +𝛽𝛽3𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠−1 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠−1 + 𝛽𝛽5𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠−1 + 𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠−1+ 𝛽𝛽7𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠−1+𝛽𝛽8𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠−1 + + [𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐1𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶1 + 𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐2𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶2 + 𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐3𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶3] 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃[ ∑  𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑘𝑘] + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−1𝑘𝑘=1   
 
              (3) 
 
 As in the relevant literature (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2016; Lopez 
Espinosa et al., 2012), lagged values for VaR and ΔCoVaR are included in our 
specification. Besides the six corporate variables, our model also include either a set 
of time dummies or a set of three dummies identifying the three subperiods in the 
financial crisis, namely Subprime Crisis, the Great Financial Depression, and the 
Sovereign Debt Crisis. 
Results obtained under different model specifications are reported in Table 
4. In column (i), we have the benchmark specification that includes only quarterly 
corporate variables and quarter time dummies; specification (ii) replaces time 
dummies with three crisis dummies: Crisis 1, i.e. the subprime crisis (2007Q3-
2008Q3), Crisis 2, i.e. the European Great Financial Depression (2008Q4-2010Q2), 
and Crisis 3, i.e. the sovereign debt crisis (2010Q3-2012Q4). Finally, in 
specification (iii) we included the interaction of corporate variables with three crisis 
dummies to capture the potential different effects of corporate variables over the 
three periods. 
 
[INSERT SOMEWHERE HERE TABLE 4] 
 
In the light that itCoVaR∆  is negative, all negative coefficients imply an 
increase in systemic risk, and vice versa. Specification (i) identifies the average 
effect of corporate variables over 2006-2012, suggesting that only a decrease in 
equity return volatility significantly affects systemic risk over the whole period. 
Specification (ii), replacing time dummies with crisis dummies, shows that over the 
three sub-periods systemic risk has largely increased, with a stronger magnitude 
during the Great Financial Depression. Comparing models (i) and (ii), we observe 
SYSTEMIC RISK IN EUROPEAN BANKING INDUSTRY 
that, while most results are qualitatively similar, the estimation fitting is much 
better when time dummies are included, instead of crises dummies (model i vs 
model ii).  
The results from model (iii) highlight the interactions between corporate 
variables and the crisis dummies. If we consider the whole period, size is correlated 
with an increase of systemic risk. Two other corporate variables, i.e. beta 
coefficient and maturity mismatch, show a statistical significance, but positive 
coefficient. This result can be interpreted as evidence of a “systemic risk shield” 
provided by both variables. In particular, maturity mismatch may be a proxy for 
interconnectedness of the intermediaries of the financial system and thus the sign of 
the coefficient shows a higher degree of interconnectivity.  
If we analyse the interactions between crisis dummies and variables during 
the subprime crisis period, we find that size is likely to be a “shield” with respect to 
the spreading off systemic risk during the three crises, although with different 
magnitudes in the three sub-periods. On the contrary, maturity mismatch7 plays an 
important role in increasing the level of systemic risk of European banks between 
2007 and 2010, period of the Great Financial Depression. This result implies that a 
decrease in banks’ short term debt may be at a first sight a signal of low risk, being 
the banks less depending on external potentially unstable market funding. A 
decrease in short term debt means a substantial reduction of interconnected credit 
lines and a fear of running out of liquidity for some banks. For this reason, the 
decrease of the degree of the banking system interconnection represents a clear sign 
of an increasing of systemic risk, which took place mainly during the Great 
Financial Depression.  
During the Great Financial Depression the beta coefficient has a positive 
impact on systemic risk. The same occurs for the market to book variable. This 
financial ratio is often implemented in the corporation evaluation process in order to 
determine corporation terminal value. If we consider the market to book value, the 
decrease of the market value may be partially slackened or emphasized by a faster 
or slower decrease in the book value. From an economic point of view, while a 
decrease in the market to book value of a corporation relies essentially on the 
dynamics of state macroeconomic variables, a decrease in the book value may 
eventually hide its roots in several reasons, ranging from accounting principles to 
the existence of possible regulation arbitrages. These institutional aspects strictly 
connected with regulation may be of some relevance in determining an increase of 
systemic risk. 
 
                                                 
7 Short term or unstable liabilities are illiquid assets and may be not a feasible device in the 
banking activity of transforming risks and maturities. The Economist on the 12th April 2014 in an 
article entitled “The slumps that shaped modern finance” writes: “Future risks were to be 
neutralized by a new legislation, the Glass Steagall rules that separated stock market operations 
from more mundane lending and gave the Fed new powers to regulate banks whose customers use 
credit for investment.” 
 




In this paper we provided robust empirical evidence on the role of banks’ 
corporate determinants to the overall systemic risk in the European financial system 
over a period of time comprising the recent financial crises. We implemented the 
CoVaR methodology of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) on a sample of 141 
European banks continuously listed over the period 2006Q1- 2012Q4 with new 
model specifications including the interaction of corporate variables with three 
crisis dummies, allowing us to capture the different effect of the corporate variables 
over the three periods.  
 We showed that maturity mismatch played a relevant role for systemic risk. 
Interconnectivity among financial institutions turns out to be a useful device for 
diversifying risk during the whole period and it increases systemic risk during the 
financial crisis.  
 We provided further evidence in support of the “too big to fail” idea. 
During the whole period banks’ size is likely to increase systemic risk, while in the 
three sub-periods, size turns out to be a sort of “insurance” against bankruptcy. 
These findings are complementary to what reported in Pais and Stork (2013), with 
specific reference to the case of crisis. In addition, we offer a more insightful 
picture than Lopez Espinosa et al (2012), we use a larger number of European bank 
and we analyse the effects of corporate variables during the three crisis sub-periods 
experienced in Europe. Size did not contribute to spread systemic risk neither in the 
Subprime Crisis, neither in the Sovereign Debt Crisis, while a marginal contribution 
to systemic risk occurs during the Great Financial Depression. On the contrary, 
maturity mismatch contributed to systemic risk in the period between 2007 and 
2010. Market to book value and beta coefficient did provide a marginal contribution 
to systemic risk during the Great Financial Depression. 
The findings in this paper suggest several developments. It will be 
important to extend the CoVaR analysis to a wider range of European banks using a 
larger but unbalanced data set; a larger number of banks per country may allow to 
identify the behaviour of different business models of banks toward systemic risk in 
financial turmoil. An alternative line of research is to employ the framework on 
systemic risk and banks to explore the role of the shadow banking (see for instance 
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TABLE 1. COUNTRIES REPRESENTED IN THE SAMPLE 
The Table classifies all banks included in our sample according to their nationality. 
The sample covers all the 24 countries in the European Union with at least one bank 
listed over the full period 2006Q1-2012Q4: 15 countries belong to the Euro zone, 
and 9 are out of the Euro zone.  
 
Euro area  Non-Euro area 
Country N. of banks  Country N. of banks 
Austria 7  Bulgaria 1 
Belgium 3  Czech Republic 1 
Cyprus 4  Denmark 25 
Finland 2  Hungary 1 
France 18  Lithuania 2 
Germany 7  Poland 13 
Greece 7  Romania 2 
Ireland 2  Sweden 4 
Italy 18  UK 6 
Luxembourg 1    
Malta 4    
Netherlands 1    
Portugal 3    
Slovakia 2    
Spain 7    






SYSTEMIC RISK IN EUROPEAN BANKING INDUSTRY 
TABLE 2. SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR XI, VAR, COVAR, ∆COVAR 
The table reports the number of observations (Obs.), mean, median, min and max 
values, standard deviation (Std. Dev.), respectively, for the market equity losses Xi 
and the 95%-risk measures, calculated for the 141 financial firms on weekly data 
from 2006Q1-2012Q4. The individual firm risk measures, VaR, are obtained by 
running 95%-quantile regressions of returns on the one-week lag of the market 
variables and by computing the predicted value of the regression. CoVaR is the 
predicted value from a 95%-quantile regression of the financial system equity losses 
on the institution equity losses and on the lagged market variables. ∆CoVaR is the 
difference between CoVaR calculated from a 95%-quantile regression and the 
CoVaR calculated from a 50%-quantile regression. Source: Datastream. 
 
 Obs. Mean Median Min Max Std. Dev 
Xi 3,948 0.002 0.000 -0.398 0.655 0.054 
VaR 3,948 -0.090 -0.076 -0.586 0.000 0.056 
CoVaR 3,948 -0.052 -0.045 -0.202 -0.011 0.024 




TABLE 3. SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR CORPORATE VARIABLES 
The table reports the number of observations (Obs.), mean, median, min and max 
values, standard deviation (Std. Dev.), respectively, of the corporate variables of the 
European banks in our sample, calculated over the full period 2006Q1-2012Q4. 
Leverage is defined as the ratio between the total assets and the book value of total 
equity (average value); maturity mismatch is calculated as the total short term debt 
minus cash to total liabilities ratio; equity return volatility is calculated as the 
standard deviation of the daily equity returns of each banks in the sample; beta is 
the equity market beta and is calculated as the ratio between the covariance of the 
equity security on the market and the variance in the market; market to book value 
is calculated as the ratio between market and book value of each bank; size 
represents the total assets of the banks, in millions of Euro (average value 
calculated over the full sample 2006-2012). Source: Datastream. 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Median Min Max Std. Dev 
Leverage 3,226 16.860 13.848 1.180 87.534 35.730 
Maturity Mismatch (%) 2,945 13.730 11.996 -118.033 78.617 15.031 
Equity return volatility 3,872 0.020 0.019 0.000 0.198 0.020 
Beta 3,872 0.760 0.723 -0.968 3.948 0.690 
Market to book value 3,268 1.170 0.949 -6.454 5.289 1.240 
Size (mn €) 2,899 54,556 7,022 0,219 940,351 110,598 
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TABLE 4. REGRESSION RESULTS. CORPORATE VARIABLES AND 
MARGINAL EFFECT DURING THE SUB-PERIODS. 
The table reports regressions using alternative model specifications. Model (i) is the 
benchmark specification using corporate variables and time dummies. Model (ii) 
incudes corporate variables, and replaces time dummies with a set of crisis 
dummies. Model (iii) includes corporate variables, time dummies and the 
interaction of corporate variables with the three crisis dummies. *, **, *** denote 
the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. Sample period: 2006Q1-
2012Q4.   
 
 (i) (ii) (iii) 











ΔCoVaR(-1) 0.490*** 0.228*** 0.379*** 0.052 0.072 0.131*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.056) (0.042) (0.044) (0.043) 
VaR(-1) 0.007* 0.011 0.024** -0.007 -0.015 -0.005 
 (0.004) (0.008) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) 
Leverage(-1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
MM(-1) 0.001 -0.027 0.019* -0.027** -0.052** -0.019 
 (0.012) (0.023) (0.011) (0.011) (0.023) (0.013) 
ERV(-1) -0.290** -0.041 -0.102 -0.227 -0.018 -0.196 
 (0.115) (0.148) (0.248) (0.274) (0.278) (0.273) 
Beta(-1) 0.004 0.003 0.010** -0.007 -0.017** -0.005 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) 
MBV(-1) 0.000 -0.003 0.001 -0.003 -0.006* -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) 
Size(-1) -0.003 -0.003 -0.007*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.003** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Crisis 1  -0.093*** -0.159***    
  (0.003) (0.037)    
Crisis 2  -0.121*** -0.076    
  (0.005) (0.055)    
Crisis 3  -0.077*** 0.018    
  (0.004) (0.039)    
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes    
SYSTEMIC RISK IN EUROPEAN BANKING INDUSTRY 
Time D. (28 
q.) 
Yes No No    
Constant -0.219*** -0.213*** -0.190***    
 (0.032) (0.068) (0.043)    
       
Observations 3,948 3,948 3,948 
R-squared 0.870 0.252 0.874 
AIC -12494 -6138 -12545 




APPENDIX. COVAR ESTIMATION 
 
The CoVar definition introduced by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) relates to the 
concept of Value-at-Risk (VaR) according to the following: 
 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 ) = 𝑞𝑞%     (A.1) 
 
 
                            
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝐶𝐶(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) ≤ (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝐶𝐶(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖)) = 𝑞𝑞%  (A.2) 
                                
 
Estimations of VaR and CoVaR are obtained by quantile regressions. First, one can 
estimate the predicted value of a quantile regression where the financial sector 
losses 𝑋𝑋𝑞𝑞




𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼�𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 + ?̂?𝛽𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖                     (A.3) 
                                              
 
where 𝑋𝑋�𝑞𝑞
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖  denotes the predicted value for a particular q%-quantile of the 
system conditional on a return realization 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 of institution i. From the definition of 
VaR, in equation (1), we have that: 
 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑞𝑞
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 = 𝑋𝑋�𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖     (A.4) 
       
 
In practice, the predicted value from the quantile regression of the system losses on 
institution i losses gives the value at risk of the financial system conditional on 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖, 
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because the 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑞𝑞
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖  is simply the conditional quantile. Using the particular 
predicted value of 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖  yields the 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖  measure. More formally, within 
the quantile regression framework, the 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖  measure is as follows 
 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑞𝑞
𝑖𝑖 = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖=𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼�𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 + ?̂?𝛽𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖     (A.5) 
    
 
The Δ𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖  is therefore given by: 
 
Δ𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑞𝑞
𝑖𝑖 = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶50𝑖𝑖 = ?̂?𝛽𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶50𝑖𝑖 )   (A.6) 
    
 
In the estimation, we include a set of state variables to capture the time variation in 
conditional moments of asset returns. With references to these specific market’s 
factors, according to  Lopez-Espinosa et al. (2012), we consider the peculiarities of 
the European institutional environment and use the following variables: 
a) the weekly price of the FTSE Stock Market volatility index ( )tFTSEVol ; 
b) the liquidity spread ( )tLiqSpread  calculated as the difference between the 
three months UK repo rate and the three months UK T bill; 
c) the change in French T-bill secondary market 3-month rate (Lopez-
Espinosa et al. (2012)  ( )tTbill∆ ; 
d) the change in slope of the yield curve represented by French 5-year minus 
three-months interest rate on government bonds  ( )tSlope∆ ; 
e) the change in credit spread, represented by the difference between Baa 
seasoned Moody’s corporate bonds and the 10-year German government 
bonds ( )tCredSpread∆ ; 
f) the weekly equity returns from the FTSE European Stock Market Index  
( Re )tFTSE turns . 
 
 
